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A GUARANTEE OF UNIVERSAL SALVATION?
Eric Reitan
Recent defenders of the Christian doctrine of eternal damnation have appealed 
to what I call the “No Guarantee Doctrine” (NG)—the doctrine that not even 
God can ensure both (a) that every person who is saved freely chooses to be 
saved and (b) that all are saved. Thomas Talbott  challenges NG on the grounds 
that anyone who is truly free will have no motive to reject God and will infal-
libly choose salvation. In response to critics of Talbott , I argue that in order to 
avoid Talbott ’s critique of NG, its defenders must adopt a view of human free-
dom in which there is a random element in choice. And if free choice involves 
such an element, then it is within God’s power to achieve a mathematical guar-
antee of freely chosen salvation for all. Thus, NG must be rejected.
I. Introduction
In recent years philosophers have turned a critical eye to the traditional 
Christian doctrine of eternal damnation (ED)—that is, the doctrine that 
some persons aft er death persist in a state of endless suﬀ ering. Contempo-
rary defenders of ED typically argue that those who are eternally damned 
end up in this state not by virtue of divine punishment for sin (as older 
theologians believed) but by virtue of their own free choices.1 The idea is 
roughly this: The suﬀ ering of the damned is the natural result of existing 
in a state of alienation from God, and even though God ardently desires to 
save all persons from this state by bringing them into loving communion 
with Him, whether or not any person is in fact saved in this way depends 
upon that person’s free choices. And, as Eleanore Stump maintains, “It is 
not within God’s power to ensure that all human beings will be in heaven, 
because it is not within the power even of an omnipotent entity to make a 
person freely will anything.”2 Thus, there can be no guarantee that all are 
saved, and ED is therefore at least possibly true.
A core premise of Stump’s line of thought is that God cannot ensure 
both that all are saved and that all the saved have freely chosen to be saved. 
But what does Stump mean when she says God cannot ensure this out-
come? Presumably, she means that it is not within God’s power to bring 
about this state of aﬀ airs even in Plantinga’s weak sense. More precisely, 
then, this line of argument assumes what I will call the “No Guarantee 
Doctrine,”or NG:
(NG): It is not within God’s power to bring it about (weakly) that 
both (a) every person who is saved freely chooses to be saved and 
(b) all are saved.
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NG has been strongly challenged in recent debates by Thomas Talbott .3 
Talbott ’s critique of NG relies, however, on an understanding of human 
freedom that, while plausible, is rejected by those who embrace a strong 
libertarian view of freedom. My aim in what follows is to argue that NG 
should be rejected even by these strong libertarians.
In critiquing NG, I assume two things. First, for the sake of simplicity I 
assume that what is necessary for salvation is a single free choice to accept 
(or not resist) God’s grace, rather than a series of such choices. This as-
sumption is in line with the views of those Christians who believe that all 
we need to do in order to be saved from damnation is to accept—or, even 
more modestly, choose not to resist—the operation of divine grace. For ex-
ample, the Lutheran Orthodox believed that once we make the choice not 
to resist God’s grace, we in eﬀ ect allow God to “fl ood” into our lives and 
proceed to do whatever is necessary to secure our eternal salvation. This is 
usually taken to involve a transformation of our character, or sanctifi cation. 
It is important to stress, however, that the Lutheran Orthodox rejected 
the idea that divine forgiveness for human sin depends on such sancti-
fi cation, instead maintaining that God’s forgiveness of sin precedes the 
transformation (the transformation itself being necessary not for deserving 
heaven, but rather for being brought into a state suitable for the enjoyment 
of heaven). The sanctifi cation process is conceived as occurring over time 
and occurring with the concurrence of the reformed will, but at this stage in 
the process, the will is freely concurring with God in only a compatibil-
ist sense. In other words, the only libertarian free choice in the process of 
salvation is the initial choice not to resist God’s grace.4 
Although I make this assumption for the sake of simplicity, my argu-
ment will work even if salvation is reached through a series of free choic-
es—even if, that is, we assume that the road to heaven involves an ongo-
ing sequence of choices that are free in the libertarian sense. For example, 
even if we accept the Lutheran view that the choices that directly perfect 
our character in the process of sanctifi cation are not free in the libertarian 
sense, one might still believe that one retains the freedom, in a libertarian 
sense, to “unplug” from the divine grace that drives the process (this ap-
pears to be what the Lutherans have historically believed). As such, there 
may be, throughout the process that culminates in eternal beatitude, a se-
quence of free choices (in the libertarian sense) not to shut oﬀ  the opera-
tion of grace. If so, then what is needed for salvation is a series of choices, 
not a single choice. I show at the end of the essay that, even assuming such 
a sequence of choices, salvation is guaranteed.
My second assumption is that once we are “saved”—not in the sense 
of having had an initial conversion experience, but rather in the sense of 
enjoying the beatifi c vision, that is, enjoying the fullness of loving commu-
nion with God—we are confi rmed in this state. In other words, once we 
are in heaven we will never return to a state of alienation from God. This 
assumption is, I suspect, nearly universally embraced by Christians. How 
could the blessed in heaven truly be “saved” from damnation if their sta-
tus is precarious and they could at any time tumble back into hell? How 
this assumption relates to human freedom is a question I will not explore 
in detail at this point, although I will return to this issue when consider-
ing objections to my argument. For present purposes, I content myself 
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with identifying two obvious alternatives: either human freedom is such 
that once one experiences the ultimate human good (loving communion 
with God) there is no possible world in which even a free person turns 
away from it; or freedom has served its purpose once one has achieved 
this ultimate good, and hence can be suspended without any violation of 
the person.5
II. Talbott ’s Critique of NG and the Libertarian Defense
In a series of articles, Talbott  oﬀ ers powerful reasons to think that no one 
who knows the signifi cance of the choice would freely choose alienation 
from God over communion with Him.6 As Talbott  claims, no one would 
have any possible motive for choosing alienation if they knew the truth 
and were not being controlled by some non-rational aﬀ ective state. The 
choice of alienation would therefore have to be based on some “ignorance, 
deception, or bondage to desire”7—in which case the choice would not be 
genuinely free. God could thus ensure the salvation of every person with-
out interfering with freedom—by simply eliminating these barriers to free 
choice, which I will henceforth refer to as “salvation inhibitors.” 
If we accept Talbott ’s reasoning, we are in eﬀ ect accepting the judgment 
that there is no possible world in which someone who is freed from all sal-
vation inhibitors will freely choose alienation from God. But here is where 
concerns about Talbott ’s thinking are most likely to arise. It is widely held 
that a minimum requirement for a choice to be free in the libertarian sense 
is that it is possible for one to have chosen otherwise. 8 If so, then we must 
take Talbott  to be supposing that, at least when human beings are con-
fronted with choosing the ultimate good in the absence of any salvation 
inhibitors, their freedom is not libertarian. Although free in the sense that 
they choose in accordance with their own desires and rational judgment 
of what is best, their choice is determined in the sense that there is no pos-
sible world which is such that it shares all the same relevant background 
conditions as the actual world (specifi cally the facts that the person has 
full knowledge of the nature of the choice and that the person is not in 
bondage to any desire) and yet the person makes a diﬀ erent choice. 
This, a critic of Talbott  might say, is not libertarian freedom but only 
compatibilist freedom. And the critic may be inclined to voice the follow-
ing complaint: Of course it is possible for God to guarantee that all freely 
choose salvation in a compatibilist sense. What is not possible is for God 
to guarantee that all freely choose salvation in the libertarian sense—more 
precisely, in the sense of free choice which is such that for every free choice 
we make it is possible for us to have chosen otherwise. But those who 
endorse NG presumably presuppose that humans have precisely this sort 
of libertarian freedom—at least until their ultimate salvation is achieved. 
And if this is true, then for each person there will always be a possible 
world in which that person freely chooses damnation.
This line of criticism, it seems to me, does not do justice to the subtlety 
of Talbott ’s views on human freedom. More precisely, I think that the 
kind of freedom that Talbott  is att ributing to human beings is neither 
compatibilist freedom nor libertarian freedom, but rather what we might 
call “rational freedom.” For Talbott , rational freedom is the only kind 
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of freedom really worth having, and hence the only kind of freedom 
that God would have a moral obligation to preserve. As I understand it, 
what I am calling rational freedom presupposes four things: fi rst, that 
values are objective, such that for every decision there is a choice that is 
objectively the best; second, that the rational faculty makes judgments 
about what is best in accord with its (oft en limited or misguided) grasp 
of this objective order of values; third, that the will can be eﬀ ectively 
“programmed” to be dominated or controlled by things other than this 
rational judgment—things such as deeply entrenched bad habits, addic-
tions, and enduring coping mechanisms derived from a dysfunctional 
childhood; fourth, that the will is “naturally” ordered to choose in ac-
cord with the judgments of the rational faculty (we might call this the 
“default sett ing” of the will), such that when non-rational controlling fac-
tors are dislodged the will always chooses in accord with these rational 
judgments. The confl ict between fi rst-order and second-order desires can 
be understood, in this scheme, as the confl ict between those desires that 
have been programmed to dominate the will and the “default” desire to 
choose in accord with the judgments of reason. 
The will, then, is naturally ordered to follow reason, and the reason is 
ordered to discern the objective order of values. When both function cor-
rectly, we have rational freedom. Rational freedom should therefore be 
contrasted with any state in which either the rational faculty is impeded 
in reaching a sound judgment about what is good, or non-rational motiva-
tions so dominate the person that the he or she is unable to choose in ac-
cord with reason. Rational freedom exists only when these impediments 
(“ignorance, deception, and bondage to desire”) are lift ed. When bondage 
to objectively irrational desires is in place and the reason is deluded into 
judging the desired objects to be good, the result is something resembling 
compatibilist freedom (one is free in the sense that one chooses in accord 
with both fi rst-order and second-order desires). When bondage to desire 
is lift ed and the reason is no longer deluded, but ignorance remains, there is 
an indeterminacy to choices that resembles libertarian freedom. Insofar as 
the Sartrian existentialist denies an objective order of values, this state of 
libertarian freedom becomes the ultimate expression of human freedom. 
But genuinely rational freedom, as that is understood by Talbott  (in keep-
ing with the Christian notion that there is an objective order of values), is 
found in neither of these states. Instead, it is found when two conditions 
are met: fi rst, the rational faculty is neither deluded nor ignorant about 
what is good, thereby providing a fully satisfactory account of what is 
good; second, the will is not subject to the control of any non-rational fac-
ulty, thereby inevitably choosing in accord with the rational faculty. 
It follows from this understanding of what free choice involves that 
anyone with genuine freedom would choose communion with God over 
alienation from God. Hence, on Talbott ’s view, not only is NG false, it is 
necessarily false. The only possible condition under which some are not 
saved would be if some were not rationally free.
Hence, those who accept NG must subscribe to some diﬀ erent under-
standing of freedom. As we will see in the next section, there are two ways 
to do so—but both approaches entail that the human freedom referenced 
in NG includes an essentially and irrevocably random element. What I 
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will show in the fi nal sections of the paper is that if freedom does include 
such a random element, then NG is false. Put another way, in order for 
defenders of NG to avoid Talbott ’s challenge they must construe the free-
dom that is at issue in NG such that it includes an element of arbitrariness 
which, once embraced, decisively undermines NG. I turn now to the task 
of showing that the alternatives to Talbott ’s understanding of freedom 
entail a random element.
III: Random Choices
As noted above, defenders of NG must subscribe to an understanding 
of freedom diﬀ erent from Talbott ’s. There are two ways to deny Talbott ’s 
view. On the one hand, they can deny Talbott ’s claim that once freed from 
all salvation inhibitors (all ignorance, deception and bondage to desire) we 
infallibly choose communion with God. They might do so on the grounds 
that any freedom worth having includes the capacity to make choices dif-
ferent from the ones that we in fact make. On the other hand, they might 
accept Talbott ’s view that once freed from all salvation inhibitors we can-
not but choose union with God, but hold that salvation is a necessary pre-
condition for being freed from all salvation inhibitors. In eﬀ ect, experience 
of the beatifi c vision is the only way to wash away all ignorance, deception, 
and bondage to desire. As such, Talbott ’s rational freedom cannot be the 
sort of freedom at issue when we are considering free choices that lead to 
salvation, and hence cannot be the sort of freedom referenced in NG. But 
there might be another kind of freedom worth having that can be exercised 
prior to salvation, a kind of freedom which is such that it is always pos-
sible for someone who possesses it to reject God. 
In this section, I show that either of these approaches requires us to hold 
that there is something essentially random or arbitrary operating in the 
“free” choices that lead to salvation. Let us begin by considering the fi rst 
approach. This approach presupposes a radical sort of libertarian freedom 
according to which it is possible for persons who are freed from salva-
tion inhibitors to nevertheless choose contrary to their own sett led and 
unwavering rational judgment concerning what is best. In other words, it 
is possible for a person not in bondage to any non-rational aﬀ ective state 
both to judge (correctly, on Christian assumptions) that choosing commu-
nion with God is infi nitely preferable to alienation from God and to choose 
alienation from God. 
Typical accounts of this sort of radically free choice betray an implicit 
confusion by appealing to motivations such as “pride” to explain the choice. 
This is confused because an implication of the judgment that choosing God 
is infi nitely preferable to choosing alienation from God is the judgment 
that satisfying one’s own “pride” is infi nitely inferior in value to achieving 
communion with God. And since we are assuming that the person is not 
in bondage to any non-rational aﬀ ective state, we are assuming that the 
person is not determined in any way to act out of pride. Thus, this supposed 
“explanation” of the radically free choice of alienation from God turns out 
to have the following form: A person who is not in bondage to prideful 
feelings and who recognizes pride to be utt erly unworthy of choice never-
theless chooses to act on pride. “Pride” can hardly explain one’s choice in 
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this situation, since one is free not to act on prideful feelings and one has 
no reason to choose pride. The choice of pride is itself a kind of inexplicable 
choice.9 What should be clear, however, is that any explanation that could 
be oﬀ ered for choosing to act contrary to one’s own sett led best judgment, 
when one is not in bondage to any non-rational aﬀ ective state, turns out 
to be this kind of empty explanation. If there is no ignorance, deception, 
or bondage to desire operating to explain the choice to reject God, then 
such a choice must remain unexplained and unexplainable. That is, there 
cannot be any reasons for making such a choice.
The result is that we can only account for this sort of radical view of 
freedom by insisting that there is something fundamentally arbitrary or 
random at work in human choice: the reason why it is possible for some-
one who is not in bondage to desire to choose contrary to what reason 
recommends is the simple fact that some human choices are inexplicably 
random.10 Furthermore, this randomness cannot be the result of a more 
basic non-random choice. When I look at a menu and cannot decide be-
tween two entrées, I may eﬀ ectively choose an entrée at random—but un-
derlying that choice is the more basic choice to “let chance decide,” and 
this choice is not random at all but based on the reasoned judgment that, 
since my preferences do not lean me towards one entrée over another, and 
since I must choose if I am to eat, it makes sense for me to make the choice 
at random. But it makes no sense at all to randomly make the choice about 
whether or not to accept God’s grace, especially if I am freed from all sal-
vation inhibitors. To choose to let chance decide whether I will know eter-
nal bliss or perpetual misery is to leave in the hands of chance the very last 
thing that any rational person would leave up to chance if he or she could 
help it. Thus, if chance does play a role in this decision, it is because the 
person can’t help it. There simply is a random element operating in human 
choice, and the operation of this random element is, in an important sense, 
outside the person’s rational control.
It might be thought that this conclusion can be avoided by holding that, 
even when all salvation inhibitors are removed, this does not entail the 
removal of all non-rational motives for action. Even if we are no longer in 
bondage to such motives, they may persist. Perhaps we can choose to re-
ject God because we retain the power to act on irrational desires—desires 
that would motivate us to reject God—even aft er we are freed from any 
bondage to such desires. The idea here is that libertarian freedom involves 
the power to select among motives, and that even once all salvation inhibi-
tors are removed there may remain motives that would lead us to reject 
God were we to choose them.
The problem with this idea is that it takes freedom to involve an act of 
choosing among motives, and it is fair to ask why we would choose one 
motive rather than another. What motivates the choice of motives? Noth-
ing? If so, then our choices turn out, once again, to be random. But if there 
is something that infl uences our choice of motives, what would that be? 
Some second-order motives, we might say. But if we are freed from all 
salvation inhibitors, then what second-order motive could inspire us to 
choose a fi rst-order God-rejecting motive? If we are freed from all igno-
rance and deception, we could have no rational basis for selecting such a 
motive. And if we have been freed from all bondage to desire, there can 
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be no second-order irrational desire that determines our selection of this 
motive. Hence, either our selection of it is random, or our selection of this 
motive is explained by the fact that we have chosen to have our choice of 
second-order motives be determined by an irrational third-order motive. 
But then this choice needs to be explained. The only escape from an infi -
nite regress here is to posit a random element operating in human choice.
This is not to say that human choices need to be conceived of as entirely 
random. We might, for example, maintain that when a person’s rational 
judgment speaks in favor of a choice, this increases the probability that 
the rationally endorsed option will be chosen. Assuming that bondage to 
non-rational aﬀ ective states has been eliminated, we might imagine that 
when reason judges “A” and “B” to be equally desirable, this aﬀ ects the 
free will by turning its decision into a kind of coin fl ip—even odds that it 
will randomly embrace “A” or “B.” If reason regards “A” as many times 
more desirable than “B,” that aﬀ ects the free will by radically reducing the 
odds that “B” will be chosen. We might imagine that the choice becomes 
like the roll of a many-sided die, with “A” being represented on more sides 
of the die than “B.” As reason more strongly favors “A” over “B,” “B” is 
represented on fewer and fewer sides.
Presumably the choice of alienation from God would be extremely im-
probable in someone who has (according to typical Christian standards of 
valuation) correctly judged communion with God to be immeasurably 
superior to alienation from God. But this is not to say that the choice is im-
possible. If we conceive of human freedom as possessing this random fea-
ture, we could still maintain in the face of Talbott ’s arguments that some 
persons who are freed from ignorance, deception, and bondage to desire 
will nevertheless choose alienation from God at any time T. The implica-
tions of this point will be developed in the next section. For now, I simply 
want to stress that those who seek to avoid Talbott ’s rejection of NG by 
understanding freedom in this radical libertarian way are committ ed to a 
view of human freedom that makes randomness an ineradicable operative 
element in our choices. 
The same is true for those who pursue the second approach sketched 
out above. Here, the idea is that salvation is a condition for rational free-
dom, because it is only once we enjoy the beautifi c vision, and are there-
fore saved, that all deception and ignorance is gone. If so, then rational 
freedom cannot be the kind of freedom we are talking about when we 
consider the choices of persons who have yet to be saved. If there are any 
free choices that are a condition for salvation, they cannot be choices that 
are free in Talbott ’s sense.
Now one conclusion to draw from this line of thinking is to hold that 
NG becomes trivially true but ceases to be an impediment to God’s sav-
ing all. This follows if we hold that rational freedom is the only true free-
dom, the only kind of freedom worth having and hence the only kind of 
freedom that would demand God’s respect. If salvation is a condition for 
rational freedom, and if rational freedom is the only meaningful kind of 
freedom that God could be called upon to respect, then there is no mean-
ingful freedom prior to salvation and it is not possible for anyone to freely 
choose to be saved. Thus, it would be trivially true that it is not within 
God’s power to guarantee that everyone makes such a choice. But neither 
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would it be compatible with God’s goodness for God to make salvation 
conditional upon a free choice when such a choice is impossible for any-
one who is not yet saved. Hence, any argument for ED that relies on NG 
would collapse.
The only way out of this predicament, for the defender of ED, would be 
to say that there exists a kind of freedom that is not rational freedom but is 
nevertheless a freedom worth having, and hence is a kind of freedom that 
God would be called upon to respect. And it is this kind of freedom that is 
being referenced in NG.
But what would this “next-best freedom” look like? Clearly, much of 
what Talbott  has to say about choices that are made in the grip of igno-
rance, deception, or bondage to desire is indisputable: Those who have 
been decisively misled and are acting on false beliefs cannot be said to act 
freely. Likewise, those who are being controlled by aﬀ ective states that 
they cannot override by even the greatest exercise of will cannot reason-
ably be said to be free. And surely God is capable of liberating us from 
such obvious impediments to free choice without the need to display the 
full and irresistible majesty of the beautifi c vision. 
The “next-best freedom” that is at issue in NG must be understood as 
the freedom that exists when all salvation inhibitors have been removed ex-
cept those that cannot be removed short of experiencing the beatifi c vision. And if 
there is anything that God cannot do prior to saving us, it is to free us from 
all ignorance. What characterizes our existence prior to our fi nal salvation 
is an ineradicable uncertainty about what is truly best. Prior to experienc-
ing the beatifi c vision, we cannot know beyond all doubt that communion 
with God is the ultimate good against which nothing else compares. And 
uncertainty about the relative value of our choices is enough to generate 
an indeterminacy in our decision-making. 
But to say that our decision-making prior to salvation is inevitably 
subject to the indeterminacy that fl ows from uncertainty about the rela-
tive value of our choices is simply to say that, in this pre-saved state, 
there is something inextricably random about our choices. This is most 
obvious when faced with the need to make a choice when our judgment 
is entirely silent. We have no reason to regard one alternative as prefer-
able to another. And so we just choose—at random. We cannot do oth-
erwise. If we truly had a reason for making the choice that we do, then 
our judgment would not be silent. In cases of complete uncertainty, our 
choice must be arbitrary.
The same is true if, among the available alternatives, our judgment 
has available to it equally strong (or weak) reasons in favor of (and/or 
against) each. If this is truly the case, then we lack any reason to prefer 
one alternative over another. When we choose option A, we might share 
the reasons that speak in A’s favor when asked, but those reasons would 
not explain why we did it, since we had equally compelling reasons to 
follow an alternative course. No reason could explain our choice. That 
we have the capacity to choose in these circumstances may be a good 
thing, insofar as the alternative is a kind of paralysis. When the motives 
for making one decision or another are equally rationally compelling 
(or uncompelling), such that our rational judgment cannot guide us, we 
nevertheless have the power to choose. But this power—precisely 
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because it is the power to choose among reasons for action that are equally 
compelling—is nothing other than the power to choose in the absence of 
reasons, that is, arbitrarily. It is the power to make a kind of mental coin 
fl ip rather than remain paralyzed.
Of course, many cases of actual choice are not like this. In many if not 
most cases, one alternative stands out as having the strongest consider-
ations in its favor. In these cases we surely can have reasons for preferring 
one alternative over another. What we cannot have is reasons for prefer-
ring the less favored option. Hence, if we do choose the less favored op-
tion, it will be for no reason at all, and hence must once again be explained 
by virtue of an arbitrariness operative in human choice. 
It is reasonable to suppose that with respect to the choice about whether 
or not to accept communion with God, at least when we have the “next-
best freedom” that exists once we have been stripped of all those salva-
tion inhibitors that can be stripped away prior to salvation, we have more 
reason to choose communion with God than we have to choose alienation. 
Hence, at the very least it is more likely that we will choose communion 
with God. But does it remain possible for us to choose alienation from God? 
If so, how? If our judgment is that the reasons in favor of choosing God 
are the most compelling, then none of the reasons against choosing God 
could explain the choice to reject God. For if we appealed to such reasons 
we would need to explain why we were acting on reasons that we judged 
to be, all things considered, poor reasons on which to act. There could 
be no reason to explain acting contrary to one’s best judgment. Pseudo-
reasons such as pride do not explain such a choice, for reasons already 
noted. Hence, if we do in some possible worlds choose contrary to our best 
judgment when the weight of evidence is suggestive but not conclusive, it 
will be because the randomness that prevails when the weight of reasons 
on both sides is balanced somehow persists when the weight of reasons 
leans in favor of one alternative. I should note, however, that the random 
element may be progressively less infl uential as the weight of reasons be-
comes more lopsided (consider again the example of the many-sided die 
in which one alternative is represented more oft en than another).
The most plausible way to reject this conclusion, it seems, is to argue 
that our choice of the less reasonable alternative is explained, not by a ran-
dom element in human choice, but rather by the willful decision to att end 
to reasons and evidence in a distorted way. We might explain the decision 
to reject God by arguing that, when we are confronted with a body of evi-
dence that is suggestive but not compelling, we have the power to att end 
to some but not all of the evidence, and hence allow the less compelling 
evidence to move us. Put another way, we decide to pay att ention to the 
reasons in favor of one choice and ignore the reasons in favor of the other. 
We thereby choose which motive will move us.
The problem with this explanation is that it posits a choice that itself 
needs to be explained, namely the choice to att end disproportionately to 
the less compelling evidence. Why make such a choice? It does not seem 
that the weight of reasons could speak in favor of this choice, so this choice 
would have to be explained either in terms of a prior choice to att end to 
reasons in a distorted way, or in terms of a random element in human 
choice. If we choose the former, then we have another choice to explain. 
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To avoid an infi nite regress of choices, we must ultimately appeal to a 
random element.
In summary, then, it appears that in order to escape Talbott ’s reasoning 
against NG, its defender must posit that the kind of freedom operative 
prior to salvation includes a random element. Why God would feel com-
pelled, morally, to respect any freedom of this sort is a question I will not 
consider with care here. It seems to me that God wouldn’t have any duty to 
respect such freedom, and that the case for ED based on NG would fail for 
that reason. But instead of pursuing that line of argument, I will challenge 
the claim that NG is true given this understanding of human freedom.
IV. Radical Libertarian Freedom and the Guarantee of Universalism
Given the view that human freedom contains a random element—what I 
will hereaft er call the radical libertarian view of freedom, a view which I 
think must be endorsed in order to avoid Talbott ’s critique of NG—does 
it follow that it is impossible for an omnipotent God to guarantee that all 
will freely choose salvation? I will argue here that it does not. Given my 
initial assumptions, which imply that once a person chooses communion 
with God that person is ultimately confi rmed in eternal bliss, it follows 
that God can save all even assuming this radical libertarian view of free-
dom. The only things God must do in order to ensure universal salvation 
are (a) strip away all those salvation inhibitors that He can strip away prior 
to salvation,11 (b) sustain every person in a temporal existence at least until 
they choose communion with God,12 and (c) leave the choice of commu-
nion with God an “open choice” such that every person is free to choose it 
at any time. It certainly seems to be the case that accomplishing all three of 
these things falls within the scope of an omnipotent being’s power.
To see why (a)–(c) would ensure universal salvation, consider the fol-
lowing. We have already argued that if (a) is met, a free person will more 
likely than not choose communion with God over alienation, even assum-
ing a radical libertarian freedom. For the sake of argument, however, let 
us suppose that the odds are even.13 If God brings about (b) and (c), then 
the choice whether or not to embrace communion with God is not a choice 
that is made only once, but rather a choice that the person is confronted 
with at every moment of an existence of potentially infi nite duration. At 
each moment of this indefi nite existence, there is a fi ft y percent chance 
that this person will choose communion with God over continued alien-
ation—at which point the person is saved. Under these conditions, the 
salvation of the person becomes a mathematical certainty.
The mathematical certainty of this outcome can be usefully depicted 
using the language of possible worlds. To do so, it will help to introduce 
some terminology. Let us call a complete possible state of aﬀ airs at any 
particular moment a “possible moment.” A “possible world” is a totality 
of temporally successive possible moments. A “possible world segment” 
is a totality of temporally successive possible moments up to a particular 
time. A “possible world tree” is a collection of possible worlds that share 
the same possible world segment up to time T (the “trunk” of the tree), at 
which point they diverge. An “indeterminacy” in a possible world seg-
ment is some random factor operative at time T such that aft er T there is 
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more than one possible world sharing the same world segment up to T. 
At any moment, there are a fi nite number of possible world segments in 
a possible world tree. However, as the timeline moves towards infi nity, 
so long as there are indeterminacies remaining within any possible world 
segment the number of possible world segments within a tree expands 
without bound.
With this terminology in mind, let us consider the claim that universal 
salvation is guaranteed under conditions (a)–(c). Let us imagine a possible 
world segment P1 in which the only thing that oﬀ ers any indeterminacy is 
Fred, who at T1 has yet to choose communion with God. Let us suppose 
further, for the sake of simplicity, that the only choice “open” to Fred, and 
thus the only source of indeterminacy in P1, is the choice of whether or 
not to accept communion with God. God removes all salvation inhibitors 
from Fred, so that at T1 there is a fi ft y percent chance that Fred will choose 
communion with God. I will assume that even though any segment of 
time is infi nitely divisible, human experience divides time into discrete 
successive moments that are not similarly divisible in human experience, 
and hence that the human capacity to make a choice takes place in such 
discrete successive moments. With this in mind, at T2, the moment imme-
diately following T1, we have two possible world segments in the possible 
world tree that shares P as its “trunk.” In one of these possible world seg-
ments (P2saved), Fred chooses communion with God. In the other, P2un-
saved, he persists in rejecting God. At T2, P2saved lacks any indetermi-
nacy: since Fred has chosen communion with God, and since that choice 
confi rms Fred in salvation, the possible world extending into the future 
from P2saved is a possible world in which Fred is saved at every subse-
quent moment. In P2unsaved, however, Fred is confronted at T2 with the 
same choice he faced at T1. Thus, at the subsequent moment, T3, we have 
three possible world segments: P2saved-ext (the extension of P2saved up 
to T3), P3saved, and P3unsaved. This process continues indefi nitely. As 
the timeline continues forward, the number of possible worlds in which 
Fred remains unsaved becomes a progressively smaller percentage of the 
possible world segments in the possible world tree branching from P1. As 
the timeline approaches infi nity, within this tree the percentage of world 
segments in which Fred has not yet made the choice of communion with 
God, and hence remains unsaved, approaches 0. Thus, following the stan-
dard mathematical rules of probability, we can say that given infi nite time 
it is mathematically certain that Fred will be saved.
In eﬀ ect, we can liken Fred to a single penny that starts out heads-side 
up in a box and has crazy-glue on its heads-side. Even if there is an even 
chance at any shaking of the box that the penny will remain head-side up, 
we would expect that in a few shakings it would get “stuck” heads-side 
down. If we are willing to ratt le the box indefi nitely, we are guaranteed 
that the penny will eventually stick in the heads-side down position. The 
guarantee is given by the fact that as the timeline approaches infi nity, the 
percentage of possible world segments (in the relevant tree) in which the 
penny remains head-side up approaches 0.
It should be obvious that the number of pennies in the box makes no 
diﬀ erence, since the same analysis can be applied to each penny. Likewise, 
if we have a world with twelve billion people rather than just Fred, the 
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outcome will be the same: given an indefi nite timeline, all will eventually 
be saved. In short, by bringing about (a)–(c), it is within God’s power to 
ensure that all are saved. Furthermore, we can add that even if the interval 
between decision-moments is signifi cantly greater than I have supposed, 
such that Fred is only confronted with a genuine choice about whether or 
not to accept God’s grace once every fi ve years, the outcome will be the 
same. So long as the timeline is infi nite, Fred is still confronted with an 
infi nite number of decision-moments.
Of course, I began with the assumption that salvation is based on a 
single choice. What if, instead, it is based on a series of choices? What if 
the process of becoming saved is a complex one in which the person must 
freely concur with God’s salvifi c intentions at every stage in the process? 
Imagine that in order for the penny to stick head-side down in the box, 
it must land heads-side down on twelve successive occasions. The prob-
ability of this happening in any given sequence of twelve coin fl ips is very 
low. Hence, we would expect that it would take a very long time for the 
penny to get stuck heads-side down. But we would still be inclined to say 
that if we had infi nite patience and kept on ratt ling forever, we would 
eventually achieve the desired result. The reason for this inclination can 
be mathematically represented in the same general way: the percentage 
of possible worlds in which the requisite sequence of outcomes has not 
yet appeared becomes progressively smaller as the timeline moves for-
ward—and while the curve is far more shallow than our previous curve, it 
still approaches 0 as the timeline approaches infi nity. Given infi nite time, 
it is mathematically certain that the requisite sequence of outcomes will 
eventually occur.
V. Objections
Perhaps the most signifi cant objection to this line of argument challenges 
my appeal to an infi nite timeline to guarantee that Fred is saved. Many 
are inclined to argue that, since one never reaches the end of an infi nite 
sequence, no actual sequence is infi nite. Likewise, no actual timeline is in-
fi nite. Hence, in any actual timeline, no matt er how long, it is possible that 
Fred remains unsaved. Put another way, at any time T the probability that 
Fred has yet to choose communion with God is a real probability greater 
than 0.
I am prepared to grant that this is true. Two responses are, however, 
warranted. First, those who want to claim that some person—say Fred—is 
forever damned are making a claim about an infi nite timeline. They are not 
merely asserting that Fred is alienated from God up to some time T. They 
are making the further assertion that Fred is damned at every time T in-
defi nitely into the future. And insofar as this claim is about an infi nite 
timeline, the mathematics of infi nity applies to it. What I have shown here 
is that Fred being forever damned has a mathematical probability of 0.
Of course, someone who takes seriously the idea that we will never 
reach the end of an infi nite timeline might be prepared to accept this point 
and abandon any claims about persons being forever damned. They might 
be prepared to embrace a more modest claim to the eﬀ ect that, for any time 
T one chooses to contemplate, it remains possible that there are persons 
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who remain alienated from God. Thus, at no time T do we have a guaran-
tee that all are saved. 
But if God is prepared to allow our temporal existence to continue until 
we choose to be saved, and if the likelihood of our remaining unsaved 
becomes increasingly remote as the timeline moves forward, isn’t there 
still a sense in which our salvation is guaranteed? Given an indefi nite (if 
not infi nite) timeline, the question becomes whether we will eventually 
reach some time T at which we choose communion with God. This is akin 
to asking whether, given the ability and willingness to fl ip a fair coin in-
defi nitely until it lands heads-up (even if that should take a trillion tries, 
or two trillion, etc.),we will eventually toss a coin that lands head-up. The 
answer is such a resounding yes that we have what amounts to a guaran-
tee. Certainly, under these conditions it is not merely reasonable to believe 
that the coin will eventually land heads-up. It would be madness to think 
otherwise. Likewise, adherence to a doctrine of eternal damnation amounts 
to a kind of insanity.
But all of this assumes that Fred’s choice to reject God at T1 (once he 
has been freed from all salvation inhibitors) will have no impact on the 
probability of Fred continuing to reject God at T2. But a critic of my posi-
tion might argue that this is an unfair assumption. Many defenders of ED 
point to a contingent psychological fact about human beings: our choices 
produce habits which dispose us to make similar choices in the future. 
God might be motivated to create us with this psychological feature be-
cause it makes it possible for us to choose to become a certain kind of 
person. We can choose our character, not merely isolated acts. Defenders 
of ED routinely appeal to this fact of human psychology, and argue that 
we can become so confi rmed in the habit of rejecting God that it is no 
longer possible for us to accept divine grace.14 This, they say, is what it 
means to be damned. Furthermore, were God to intervene in this process 
of character-formation, God would be interfering with our freedom to 
choose what kind of people we are to become.15
Following this line of thought, a critic of my argument might say that 
if Fred is freed from all salvation inhibitors (or at least all those that can 
be eliminated prior to salvation) he might yet choose to reject God, and if 
he does so this choice might initiate a process of character-formation that 
would, if Fred is suﬃ  ciently unlucky, culminate in a fi xed God-rejecting 
character. Fred progressively hardens his heart against God. The more of-
ten he rejects God, the more likely he is to reject God again in the future, 
until eventually he reaches a point where he has an irredeemably bad 
heart. Furthermore, according to this challenge, God could not interfere 
with this process without also interfering with Fred’s freedom to choose 
who he is to become. As such, it is not in God’s power to ensure that Fred 
is saved without interfering with Fred’s freedom. And so, it might be con-
cluded, NG is true aft er all.16
In my statement of this argument, I used the phrase “if Fred is suf-
fi ciently unlucky.” I did so quite deliberately. I have argued that if Fred 
is able to choose to reject God when he is freed from all salvation in-
hibitors, and hence has absolutely no motive whatsoever to reject God 
and every conceivable reason to embrace Him, the reason is that there is 
something fundamentally arbitrary at work in human free choice. This, I 
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have suggested, is what the strong libertarian defender of ED must hold. 
Thus, in order for this challenge to my argument to work, we must as-
sume that the habit-forming feature of human choice applies not only to 
choices that proceed from reasoned judgment, but also to fundamentally 
random choices of the sort operative when Fred, freed from all salvation 
inhibitors, nevertheless rejects God. Only on this assumption can Fred’s 
random choice to reject God create any hardening of heart. 
Notice, also, that even if hardness of heart is partly responsible for 
Fred’s present choice to reject God, in that it aﬀ ects the probabilities in fa-
vor of rejecting God, if the hardness of heart arose from a previous choice 
that was determined entirely by the random element of human choice, 
then this random element fully explains Fred’s current rejection of God.
With that in mind, the objection to my argument can be restated as fol-
lows: Fred might be eternally damned because he might be so unlucky 
that the random element of human choice operates against his interests 
not once, but so consistently as to ultimately deprive him of the freedom 
to choose in favor of his interests. And God so respects the operation of 
this random element that he would rather see Fred damned by bad luck 
that interfere with these “coin fl ips” or their tragic outcome.
Now it’s surely problematic to describe this random process, which in-
fl icts on Fred a fi xed God-rejecting character, as the process of Fred “freely 
choosing a God-rejecting character.” But that’s exactly what must be main-
tained for this objection to my argument to work. So, for the sake of argu-
ment, let’s treat this as a case of Fred freely choosing to harden his heart 
against God. If we do so, then we might well say that it is not within God’s 
power to save poor unlucky Fred without interfering with Fred’s freedom. 
But what we now confront is a new diﬃ  culty: Why would anyone think 
that Fred’s freedom in this sense is worth preserving? Why think that God 
has some moral obligation to sit and watch the random element in Fred’s 
will doom him to eternal misery?
If there really is a random element operating in human freedom, it 
would seem that a good God would so structure human psychology that 
choices resulting entirely from this random element would be exempted 
from the habit-forming tendencies characteristic of other choices. It makes 
sense for God to design us so that deliberate, reasoned choices play a role 
in forming our character. It doesn’t make sense for God to allow meta-
phorical coin fl ips to do so. 
To put the point in its simplest terms: a random element in human free-
dom, coupled with a policy of divine non-interference with the operation 
of human freedom, can be reconciled with God’s goodness if the random 
element lacks the power to fi x character. Aft er all, under those conditions, 
as I’ve argued, nobody will be doomed by bad luck. But the following con-
junction cannot, it seems, be reconciled with God’s goodness: the random 
element in human freedom has the capacity to fi x character, and God re-
fuses to interfere with this random process or its consequences even when 
the process results in a person’s eternal damnation. 
This conjunction implies that God would permit bad luck to damn 
someone. But it seems that a perfectly good God who had the power to 
prevent bad luck from damning a person, without doing something that 
is morally objectionable in itself, would do so. And it seems that He does 
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have this power. For he has the power to design human psychology such 
that the random element of human choice (assuming that there is such a 
thing) lacks the capacity to fi x character. And there does not seem to be 
anything morally objectionable about doing this.
Hence, anyone committ ed both to the strong libertarian view of free-
dom and to the view that God never interferes with human freedom 
should deny that Fred’s randomly determined choices are habit forming. 
But if we admit that these random choices are not habit-forming, then God 
can guarantee that Fred freely chooses salvation by bringing about (a)–(c), 
and my original argument stands.
I turn now to a fi nal objection. I save this objection for last because re-
fl ecting on it will prove especially helpful in highlighting the implications 
of the arguments developed here. The guarantee of universal salvation de-
fended here depends upon my assumption that, once a person has made 
the choice (or sequence of choices) that brings about communion with 
God, that person is confi rmed in bliss and there is no longer any possibil-
ity of becoming alienated from God. But a critic might wonder whether, 
given this assumption, it can meaningfully be claimed that anyone freely 
chooses communion with God.17 
To see the potential problem here, consider the following analogous 
case. Imagine a universe in which a supremely powerful Devil is able to 
confi rm in damnation anyone who has made the choice to commit a par-
ticular sin, call it S. Let us suppose, as before, that there is a random ele-
ment operative in human choice. All it takes for damnation is one unfortu-
nate random choice. We will assume, furthermore, that those who persist 
in resisting S do not become confi rmed in that choice. They do not become 
“S-resistant,” but remain equally likely to choose S at some time in the 
future. We might imagine that, as before, the random element in choice is 
aﬀ ected by rational judgments, so that those who judge S to be a foolish 
choice are unlikely to randomly choose it (and hence damnation), but still 
have some possibility of doing so—the choice of S appears on one side of a 
many-sided die. In such a case, it is guaranteed, given an infi nite timeline, 
that even these wise persons who consistently resist S over time will be 
damned, because given infi nite time it is mathematically certain that there 
will be at least one unlucky roll of the dice. Thus, universal damnation 
would be guaranteed. But would we want to say that, in such a universe, 
all those who are damned freely choose to be damned? 
There is something intuitively implausible about saying so. Hence, my 
critic will argue, it is likewise implausible to claim that, given my picture 
of things, the saved freely choose to be saved.
This criticism, however, assumes a parity between the two cases that 
cannot reasonably assumed.18 Whatever one thinks of the plausibility of 
the radical libertarian view of freedom, the claim that the damned in the 
analogous case freely choose their state is implausible for reasons that do 
not apply to the claim that the saved freely choose their fate when condi-
tions (a)–(c) obtain. The disanalogy rests on why the damned in the anal-
ogous case would be confi rmed in damnation aft er choosing alienation 
from God.
At the start of the paper I oﬀ ered two possible accounts of how human 
freedom might be related to the assumption that the saved are confi rmed 
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in bliss once they have made the choice (or sequence of choices) that brings 
about communion with God: either human freedom is such that once one 
experiences loving communion with God there is no possible world in 
which even a free person turns away from it; or freedom has served its 
purpose once one has achieved this ultimate good, and hence can be sus-
pended without any violation of the person.
Neither of these alternatives can be plausibly invoked in the case of 
someone confi rmed in damnation. This fact may explain why it is highly 
implausible to claim that the damned in the analogous case have freely 
chosen their state.19 To see why this is so, let us consider both of the ac-
counts, sketched out above, of the relationship between human freedom 
and being confi rmed in blessedness. The fi rst assumes that once we have 
achieved communion with God our freedom acquires a compatibilist char-
acter (even if it may not have had such a character prior to salvation). This 
strikes me as the far more plausible account, especially when we explain 
it in terms already discussed in section III. As noted in that section, one 
way to avoid Talbott ’s critique of NG is to hold that, prior to salvation, we 
cannot have complete knowledge of the good, since such knowledge only 
comes once we have achieved the communion with God that constitutes 
salvation. This response to Talbott  does not deny his account of freedom 
or the value that he att aches to it, but rather denies that perfect freedom in 
Talbott ’s sense can be att ained prior to salvation. Prior to salvation, we lack 
complete knowledge of the ultimate good. In the absence of such knowl-
edge, there remains an inescapably arbitrary dimension to human choice. 
But on this view, once we have achieved communion with God that 
arbitrary element disappears, because we now have the complete knowl-
edge that we had lacked. With this fullness of knowledge, our rational 
freedom can operate unimpeded by any ignorance, and it will inevitably 
choose what is best: union with God.
On this picture, it should be obvious both that confi rmation in blessed-
ness is no violation of human freedom (but rather the perfection of it) and 
that there can be no confi rmation in damnation that has a parallel expla-
nation that renders it similarly compatible with human freedom. On the 
contrary, it seems that in order for a person to be confi rmed in the choice 
of damnation, the person must be in the grip of some signifi cant decep-
tion or bondage to desire—both of which are impediments to freedom. 
Given the nature of freedom, the only way to confi rm someone in a state 
of alienation from God is to thwart the exercise of freedom, whereas all 
that is needed to confi rm someone in blessedness is to bring about a state 
in which all impediments to freedom are removed.
The critic of my argument fares no bett er by opting for the second ac-
count of the relationship between human freedom and confi rmation in 
blessedness. On this account, the reason why the blessed cannot fall away 
is because their freedom has achieved its purpose and hence needn’t be 
sustained. Again, this account is best understood in terms of ideas raised 
in section III. In that section, I suggested that another way to avoid Tal-
bott ’s arguments against NG is to reject his account of freedom altogether 
on the grounds that the only valuable kind of freedom involves the ca-
pacity to have done otherwise. In other words, to have a freedom worth 
having with respect to some choice, it must be the case that one does 
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not make the same choice in every possible world. Since Talbott ’s ratio-
nal freedom entails that, under ideal conditions, one does make the same 
choice in every possible world, this account of freedom is regarded as 
defective. What I showed was that, in order to have this supposedly valu-
able freedom at all times, it must be the case that when one has every 
reason to make one choice and no reason to make another, there remains 
some possible world in which one chooses in a manner that is contrary to 
all reasons—and hence chooses without reason, or arbitrarily.
It is, admitt edly, hard to fathom what purpose such freedom would 
serve in the created order, or why anyone would regard it as valuable (let 
alone the most valuable kind of freedom). But let us assume for the sake of 
argument that there is something intrinsically valuable about this kind of 
radical libertarian freedom. If we make the further assumption, as defend-
ers of ED seem to do, that freely chosen salvation is superior in some way 
to salvation that is not so chosen, then the purpose of this kind of freedom 
would presumably be to achieve this superior outcome. That is its telos 
in the natural order. But freedom of this kind, if possessed by the saved, 
would compromise their salvation by rendering it subject to arbitrary loss. 
And a salvation that is impermanent and can be lost by an unlucky roll of 
the dice is no salvation at all. Hence, if we construe freedom in this radical 
way, freedom must be revoked in order for salvation to exist. And if the 
purpose of freedom is to make possible freely chosen salvation, then this 
freedom must be revoked once salvation is chosen in order for freedom 
to serve its function in the natural order. Such loss of freedom would not 
violate the telos of freedom but would be required by it, and hence could 
not be construed as a morally objectionable violation of freedom.
Understood in these terms, freedom can be legitimately revoked only 
once the creature has chosen salvation. Revoking it when a creature has 
chosen damnation would be a wrongful violation of freedom—thus ex-
plaining our intuitive judgment in the analogous case.
This outcome can be avoided only by assuming a diﬀ erent purpose for 
human freedom. For example, one might believe that there is something 
intrinsically desirable about a universe in which the fi nal destiny of every 
person is a freely chosen one, and that the purpose of human freedom is to 
bring about such a desirable state. But if freedom is understood to involve 
an inexplicably random element, this would amount to saying that there 
is something intrinsically desirable about a universe in which the fi nal 
destiny of every person is determined by chance. As hard as it is to make 
sense of the claim that radical libertarian freedom is intrinsically valuable 
and that salvation freely chosen in this sense is preferable to salvation not 
so chosen, it is even more diﬃ  cult to make sense of the claim that there is 
something intrinsically desirable about a universe in which at least some 
are damned, and their damnation is the result of nothing but bad luck. 
Surely given the Christian understanding of God, we could not think that 
God would judge such a universe to be intrinsically desirable.
Perhaps what all of this shows most clearly is that there is something 
fundamentally misguided about the view that radical libertarian freedom 
is intrinsically valuable and preferable to the kind of rational freedom that 
Talbott  describes. Hence, if we want to reject Talbott ’s argument against 
NG, the only plausible strategy is to accept his view of freedom but argue 
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that prior to salvation it can only operate imperfectly. But if this is ac-
cepted, it is plain why we can plausibly maintain that the damned in the 
analogous case did not freely choose their state while the saved, given 
conditions (a)–(c), did.
In summary, it seems that by performing (a)–(c), God could guaran-
tee the salvation of all in a manner that respects human freedom. And it 
seems clear that it is within the power of an omnipotent God to perform 
(a)–(c). NG thus seems to be false, and conservative theists may need to 
look elsewhere for a plausible justifi cation of ED—by, for example, argu-
ing that there is something morally problematic with performing (a)–(c).It 
will not work to say, with Stump, that it is simply not in God’s power to 
bring about the freely chosen salvation of all.20
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